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D R A F T
ESSAY
WHAT DEFAULT RULES TEACH US ABOUT CORPORATIONS;
WHAT UNDERSTANDING CORPORATIONS TEACHES US ABOUT
DEFAULT RULES
TAMAR FRANKEL•
ABSTRACT
This Essay addresses corporate law’s Default Rules, which allow corporations to waive their
directors’ liability for damages for breach of their fiduciary duty of care. Most large corporations have
adopted such a waiver. This Essay distinguishes Private Contracts from Public Contracts. Public Contracts
include legislation, referendums, and votes on specific outcomes, such as union members’ votes on the
contracts that their representatives agreed upon with management. This Essay shows that the courts view
corporations and corporate articles as Public Contracts. In some Public Contracts gap-filling rules limit the
scope of the Public Contracts to the information that the voters received before they voted. In waiver cases,
however, the courts do not limit the scope of the waivers to the information that the voting shareholders
received before they voted for the waivers. The Essay suggests that courts should follow Public Contract
gap-filling rules and interpret the waivers as limited to the circumstances in which the voters voted, and the
information they received before the voting.
INTRODUCTION
This Essay addresses two questions. First, what can we learn about the nature of
corporations from the Default Rules that the courts have developed with respect to the
reduced remedies for the directors’ breach of their duty of care? I call the reduction of the
remedies Waivers. Second, in light of the nature of the corporations as reflected in
judicial rules, how could the courts improve the gap-filling default rules that they applied
in connection with the Waivers?
In Part I discuss default rules and gap-filling rules for public and private contracts.
Part II discusses the difference between public and private contracts. Part III
demonstrates that the courts treat corporations as public contracts. Part IV poses the
question of who cares about the different status of a corporation? Part V proposes to limit
the scope of the Waivers to the relevant information the voters received before they voted
for the Waivers.
The Two Kinds of Default Rules. This Essay deals with two kinds of default
rules that govern corporate directors’ duty of care. One kind of default rule is the
statutory default rule that permits corporate shareholders to reduce the remedies for
2directors’ breach of their duty of care. The other kind consists of the gap-filling rules that
the courts use in interpreting the statutory default rules and includes the interpretation of
the corporate articles, which waive some aspects of the duty. To avoid confusion, the
statutory default rules will be called Permissive Default Rules. The gap filling rules will
be called Gap-Filling Rules or Gap Fillers.
Waiver of damages remedy for the directors’ breach of fiduciary duty of
care. I chose to focus on the Waiver in part because of the recent corporate scandals. In
many corporations the directors failed to inquire about signs of problems. In many other
corporations the directors opened the door to unethical and legal violations, and failed to
strictly supervise the managers’ actions thereafter.1 The Chief Executive Officers (CEOs)
of these corporations selected the candidates to for their boards and viewed the directors’
main function as advisory. Generally, advice and supervision do not match well. Advice
assumes that the CEO can take the advice or leave it. Supervision leaves the final
decision to the board, and allows the board to direct and overrule the CEO’s choice. In
the 1990s, these boards took the advisory role more seriously than the supervisory role.2
In addition, it is unclear that wrong-doings in large corporations have not persisted to this
very day.
Most importantly, large corporations affect the nation’s economy and financial
system. They have become cross-border private governments. External police cannot
reach far into these mammoth organizations, and internal policing by the boards has been
weak. To be sure, the reach of the directors’ policing is limited. Yet, they can have some
supervisory impact. For example, a sensitive board could discover accounting problems.
If management reported a 40% loss, and a month later, management showed the board a
loss of 20%, and a few weeks later the losses disappeared and gains began to appear, the
directors could ask for an explanation. They might then find that the amazing growth of
profit was due to a change in accounting. Had the board been delighted with the sharp
and magical change of fortune, and not sought evidence of the reasons, it would not have
met its duty of care.
The history of the Default Rule on the Waiver. Regardless of whether the
directors were sleeping at the helm or rejoicing in the corporations’ performance without
questions, the directors of large corporations have been shielded by a waiver of damage
remedies for breaching their duty of care, as stated in the Corporate Articles. The story of
these waivers is well known. In 1985, the Delaware Court decided the case of Smith v.
Van Gorkom.3 The court held that the directors did not pay sufficient attention and did
not adequately study the proposed purchase of the corporation. In fact, they approved a
contract unseen. Therefore the court held that the directors did not meet their duty of
care. One could speculate on whether the court did in fact change its interpretation of the
directors’ duty of care. One could speculate that the court’s motives were to tighten the
directors’ duty of care only with respect to mergers and acquisitions of their
corporations.4 At that time, however, the decision was deemed to signal a heightened
judicial scrutiny of the directors’ supervision. Corporate management was alarmed. The
premiums on Directors & Officers insurance rose.
3The Delaware legislature responded to management’s concerns by amending
corporate law. Rather than reducing the level of the breach of duty of care or the
remedies for such a breach, Delaware converted the rule concerning this duty into a
default rule. It allowed corporations to limit the damages against directors who breached
their duty of care.5 Professor Lucian Bebchuk noted that “the path taken by Delaware and
those other states was the desirable one. Had the lenient arrangement been set as default,
shareholders might well have been unable to amend the charter to opt out of it, even if it
turned out to be the arrangement they disfavored.”6 Thus, it was better for the law to
maintain the higher standard and offer an opportunity to reduce it. Corporate directors,
who hold the key to amending the Corporate Articles, would be interested in a Waiver
and would seek the shareholders’ approval for it. They did.
Most states followed Delaware’s lead and adopted similar legislation.7 Some
states reduced the directors’ liabilities subject to the shareholders’ vote for “opting out,”
or directly provided a partial waiver of the directors’ liabilities.8
Learning about the nature of corporations by the kind of Gap-Filling rules.
When a question arises about the nature of the Corporate Articles and the Permissive
Default Rules, or the extent of the permissible Waiver, courts use Gap-Filling Rules. To
fashion Gap-Filling Rules and Permissive Default Rules in any situation, not just in
corporate law, courts must first define the relationships among the parties. Underlying all
judicial interpretations are assumptions about the nature and terms of the relationships
that they address. Gap-Fillers for the terms of family relations, for example, are quite
different from Gap-Fillers for the terms of business relations. Reneging on a promise to
marry is interpreted differently from reneging on a business deal. That is why before the
rules can be fashioned and applied, the courts must be clear about the nature of the
relationships to which they apply.
Are corporate relationships Private Contracts, or Public Contracts  Similar
to legislation). For the past thirty years the corporate form of organization and the
relationships between the shareholders, the directors and the officers of a corporation was
characterized as an “aggregation of Contracts.”9 The concept and the name were
imported from the discipline of economics.10 The changes in the management’s duty of
care were cast as the shareholders’ contractual consents to an amendment of the
Corporate Articles.
The idea of a contract was not born in modern economics. It existed in philosophy
and the social sciences and had different meanings in the works of Hobbes, Kant, Locke,
and Rousseau.11 Contract, however, is a legal category as well, and in the law it has a
more specific meaning and applicable rules. Applying the law of contract to a
relationship among the corporate shareholders, directors and officers simplifies on the
one hand, but distorts on the other hand. It provides just one familiar model of
relationship, which makes it easier to apply to all situations. It distorts because the model
does not fit all relationships and brings about inappropriate results. I argue here that
corporations are not treated as Private Contracts. Rather, the rules that are applied to them
are the rules that govern Public Contracts, such as the rules that are applied to legislation.
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5Yet, what are the differences between Public Contract and Private Contract? After
all, both types are relationships among at least two persons (with few exceptions). Both
are voluntary relationships. Both share the concept of an accord, harmony, and a notion
of a common pattern of behavior among willing parties. Both share an idea of a
commitment, and binding reciprocal promises. Both Public Contract and Private Contract
are governed by rules of entry into the relationship and exit from the relationship. Both
impact third parties that did not participate in the relationships. And both provide some
flexibility for changing the governing terms of the relationships. Therefore, it seems that
there are no reasons to apply to both the same Gap-Filling interpretative rules.
And yet, the fundamental differences between Public and Private Contracts
appear in each feature that they share. With few exceptions, Public Contracts are not
personal. Parties enter the relationships by qualification rather than upon the other
parties’ consent. In contrast, Private Contracts are personal and entering parties must be
accepted by all the other parties.  The form of the parties’ agreement differs. Public
Contracts are based on consensus; Private Contract -- on consent. And the amendment of
their terms follows these different modes of agreement as well.
Generally, Public Contracts have more impact on third parties than Private
Contracts have. Further, most Public Contracts are negotiated and designed by the
representatives of the parties rather than the parties themselves. These representatives
have far more control over the matters they manage. In fact, both corporate directors,
who provide the shareholders with the text on which they will vote, and political
representatives who establish the terms of the Public Contracts, usually without soliciting
the voters’ direct approval of the text, need to muster a consensus of the voters at one
point, but are not subject to the approval of each and every one of the voters. These
representatives are expected to commit to the enterprise rather than to the particular
voters who chose them. In contrast, most Private Contracts are negotiated by the parties.
If the parties use personal representatives, the representatives are subject to the control of
the parties that chose them.
Approvals of Public Contracts can involve a vote for specific provisions, such as
the Waiver in the Corporate Articles, especially if the shareholders will forego the right
to claim damages from the directors who fail in their duty of care. A comparison with the
situation of union members, however, is instructive. Union members have elected
representatives that negotiate with management on the union’s behalf. There is no legal
requirement for union members to vote on the contracts that their representatives have
concluded with management on behalf of the unions,12 although ratification of contracts
may be required in the unions’ constitutions or under certain other conditions.13 The
representatives of the union are treated similarly to agents.14 However, this union’s Public
Contract is not frozen on the date of signature. Rather, it is subject to on-going,
continuous adjustments, by negotiations or arbitration among the union representatives
and the management. Thus, if the parties did not contemplate new events, the door is
open to either party to demand reconsideration of the terms of the relationship. Therefore,
the parties are in a continuous mode of re-negotiation.
6Corporate relationships typically fit Public, not Private, Contracts. Shareholders
and managers enter the relationships without the consent of the other parties to the
corporate relationships, but by qualifying for entry. The directors make their decisions
according to the good of the corporation and not according to the interests or dictates of
the shareholders that voted for them. Shareholders’ decisions, including their approval of
Waivers, are reached by a consensus and not by consent, and the directors initiate the
votes and write the text.
A view of the Gap-Filling Rules tells us that the courts do not treat the terms of
the relationships among directors, officers and shareholders as Private Contracts. Rather
they treat the relationship among these parties as Public Contracts. An examination of the
differences between Private Contracts and Public Contracts teaches us that courts limit
the Waiver to the extent allowed in the Default Rule. Courts look to the “legislative
history” of the statutory Default Rule and the Corporate Articles. That is not their
approach to Private Contracts.
Is the Gap-Filling Rule applied by the courts the optimal rule for the
Corporate Articles that contain the Waiver?  In fashioning Gap-Filler rules, not only
the legislative history plays a significant role, but also the text. If the text and the
legislative history relate to each other. If the text is limited and specific, the legislative
history legislative history should relate to the limited and specific text.
A waiver of fiduciary duties, just as the waiver of any entitlement, whether
quantified or not, requires a specific description of the circumstances in which such a
waiver would apply. Voters are not prescient. Even if they receive true information of
today’s reality and the purpose of the Waiver, they do not know how much the Waiver
will cost them in other circumstances in the future.
Like all judicial Gap-Fillers, the courts attempt to foresee the voters’ expectations.
In the case of waiver of fiduciary duties, however,  the legislative history can clarify the
voters understanding, intentions, and expectations. The legislative history of Waivers is
the reasons and information that the voters have received and are likely to have based
their vote.
Therefore, I conclude that the courts should further limit the scope of Waivers to
the information and reasons that the shareholders received before they voted to approve
the Waivers, and to the circumstances in which the Waivers were granted. If the
circumstances surrounding the voting have changed materially, the directors should
renew and refresh the effect of the waiver by seeking the shareholders’ votes after
disclosing to the shareholders information about the new environment. If the courts signal
such a requirement, the directors of most corporations may have the incentives to do so
on a regular basis. The directors, the shareholders and the courts would benefit from
clearer and more predictable rules in this area.
7PART I: PERMISSIVE DEFAULT RULES AND GAP-FILLING RULES FOR
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CONTRACTS
The Nature of Permissive Default Rules
This Essay deals with two kinds of default rules. One kind of default rule is a rule
from which the parties are allowed to “contract out.” The Uniform Commercial Code and
corporate laws offer default rules of this sort.15 These rules are binding on the parties
unless the parties expressly agree on different terms in their relationships. This is the type
of default rule that relates to the remedies that apply to the directors’ violations of their
duty of care. Similarly, the U.S. constitution offers default rules for legislation,
maintaining the rules so long as Congress does not provide otherwise.16 These are the
“Permissive Default Rules.”
The second type of a default rule is a rule used to fill in gaps in the parties’
agreements, when their text is silent about a particular situation that has arisen. As H.L.A.
Hart recognized, "our relative ignorance of fact" and "our relative indeterminacy of aim"
require what I call a “Gap-Filling Rules.”17 No text is truly unambiguous. The Gap-
Filling Rules enter the stage after the parties have established the terms of their
agreements, and is sometimes referred to as "implied-in-law."18
Both Permissive Default Rules and Gap-Fillers involve actions by the parties to
the relationships. However, in the case of Permissive Default Rules the parties react to a
rule promulgated by an authority and either tacitly accept or “correct” the rule. In the case
of Gap-Filling Rules, the authority reacts after the parties have established the terms of
the relationship. In such a case a third party—usually the judiciary—uses Gap-Filling
Rules to interpret the terms of the parties’ relationship.
Gap-Filling Rules for Private Contract and Public Contracts
The purpose of Gap-Fillers that interpret Private Contracts and Public Contracts is
similar. In both cases the interpreter seeks to discover the parties’ intent and speculates
on how they would have answered the question at hand before they entered into the
Private or the Public Contract relationships, had they been aware of the circumstances
that have arisen later. But that is where the rules applicable to the two types of
relationships part ways.
Gap-Filling Rules For Private Contract. Gap-Fillers for Private Contracts
derive from the express terms of the Contract, signaling the motivations and incentives of
each party and their possible attitude towards the unanswered question that arose from
their dealings. These Gap-Fillers could derive from the presumed parties’ understanding,
or from the general practice in the particular area, on the assumption that the parties
would have acted as many others in the same position would have acted.19 Thus, if the
situation was not provided for in the Private Contract and not anticipated by the parties,
the courts will look to the “omitted term”20 to discover the parties’ intention.
8For the purpose of this discussion, three points are important.
(1) In general, when applying Gap-Filling Rules to Private Contracts, the courts
do not resort to the previous negotiations among the parties.21 Contracts may be
explained or supplemented by the course of the parties’ dealing (later performance, after
the contract was signed).22
(2) Generally, the interpretation of the text ignores the parties’ different
bargaining power,23 except when the process which led to the Contract was faulty, for
example, when a party was induced to enter into the agreement by fraud, undue
influence, or duress.24
(3) If neither parol evidence nor canons of constructions resolve the matter, the
courts turn to concepts such as “good faith,” “fairness,” and “policy.”25
Thus, in general, Gap-Filling Rules applicable to Private Contracts ignore the
parties’ negotiations before they entered into the Contract, ignore the parties’ disparate
bargaining positions, and apply as a last resort, notions of good faith, fairness and policy.
Gap-Fillers for Public Contracts. In contrast to Gap-Filling Rules for Private
Contract, in which the courts will not peek to uncover the parties’ negotiation before the
Contract was concluded (with the few exceptions mentioned above), in applying Gap-
Filling Rules to Public Contracts, such as legislation, the reverse seems to be the main
source of interpretation. Unless the courts determine that the text is unambiguous, the
interpretation of Public Contracts often draws on the “legislative history.”26 Private
Contract Gap-Filling Rules are based on the courts’ assumption about the parties’
possible reactions to the conflict, or other extraneous circumstances after the parties
entered into the Private Contract relationship.27 In contrast, Public Contract Gap-Filling
Rules are usually drawn from the opinions of the parties and others expressed in
legislative hearings and congressional reports before the legislation was passed.28
Similarly, in the context of the U.S. Constitution, the statements of the founding fathers
before the adoption of the constitution are closely examined.
If Corporate Articles were treated as Private Contracts, the courts would refrain
from examining any decisions of the directors and any materials that were sent to the
shareholders before the vote was taken. But if the Corporate Articles are treated as Public
Contracts, the courts may well draw on precisely this source of information.
In contrast to most Private Contract situations, the parties’ representatives in
Public Contract situations, such as elected representatives, usually prepare the text
presented to the voters. Only in special kinds of referendums do voters prepare the text.
In most cases the voters can seek a court decision on the exercise of their representatives’
powers, as well as on the meaning of the text. This challenge can include attacks on the
authority of the voters and the State in the context of a referendum.29 In the context of
Public Contracts adopted by union members, changes are continuously made by the
representatives of the union members and the management. Hence, litigation in this area
9focuses on the authority of the union representatives.30 Generally union representatives
may make changes in the unions’ Public Contracts, regardless of whether the union
members voted on the contracts. That is because the union representatives and the
management have an on-going relationship in which they can re-negotiate the contracts
if unanticipated events have occurred or the environment has changed.
In contrast to union officers, corporate directors do not act as exclusive
representatives of the shareholders. Shareholders do not have representatives to negotiate
on their behalf with the directors or with management. The Waivers are not negotiated,
but rather presented to shareholders on a “take it or leave it” basis, and there are no
mechanisms to review the Waiver in light of new circumstances.
PART II. COURTS’ DEFAULT RULES FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS’ DUTY
OF CARE
Courts Interpret the Default Rule Concerning Corporate Directors’ Duty of Care and
the Corporate Articles as Public Contracts
Corporate Articles that contain a Waiver have opted-out of the corporate law rule.
The authority on which these Corporate Articles is based is the Default Rule in the
corporate statute. Had the corporate laws been silent about the directors’ duty of care, the
common law rule would have applied and imposed a duty of care on the directors. It is
unclear whether and to what extent the common law duty of care is a Default Rule. In any
event, state legislatures have found it in their wisdom to restate the common law rule in
the statutes as an unconditional rule. Only later did the legislatures change the rule into a
Default Rule which allowed them to contract out of the common law. 31
When the shareholders amended the Corporate Articles to adopt Waivers, the
courts interpreted the Waivers as they interpret Public Contracts. The courts focused on
the Permissive Default Rules that allowed the Waiver and on the limitations that the rules
imposed. Then the courts examined the facts of the cases to determine whether the
directors’ behavior of which the shareholders complained, fell within or outside the
Default Rules and Corporate Articles,32 that is, whether the directors were sheltered by
the Waiver. The “legislative history,” so to speak of the Corporate Articles could draw on
the intent of the management and the shareholders, as articulated in the proxy statements,
the shareholders’ reports and other corporate documents, and perhaps in shareholders’
opinions. Indeed, there are cases in which the plaintiffs sought a court determination of
whether the disclosure to the voting shareholders was truthful or misleading under the
securities acts.33 These decisions parallel the attack on the integrity of the voting process,
and were limited to the truth of the disclosed information. But if the process was not
contaminated by misleading statements, the courts did not go any further. They did not
interpret the Corporate Articles in light of the true information that the voters received,
and did not limit the permissible range of the Waiver in the Default Rules and the
Corporate Articles to the actual facts on which the voters relied when they voted to
amend the Corporate Articles. So long as the facts were true, the facts did not provide the
boundary to the permissible Waiver.34
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Thus, in general, while the courts will not allow access to evidence of the parties’
negotiations before the Private Contract was signed,35 they will resort to “legislative
history” before the Public Contract -- the legislation -- is passed.36 The Public Contract
Gap-Filling Rule focuses on what the parties would have said had they been asked or had
they faced the situation at hand.37 The legislative Gap-Filling Rule focuses on the
problems that led to the legislation, and the information that led to the solutions.38
The reason for this distinction relates to the process by which the two kinds of
relationships—Private Contracts and Public Contracts -- are established. Private Contract
parties can start negotiations on one deal and end up with another. They are less bound by
a pre-determined process than Public Contract parties, and the history of their negotiation
provides a less reliable source of evidence about their intentions than the legislative
history of a Public Contract. The legislative history of Corporate Articles’ Waiver is
procedurally similar to that of legislation, and perhaps even more focused than
legislation. That is because the Waivers involve not merely conflict of interest
transactions, but the remedy which shareholders could claim for breach of fiduciary
duties. In that respect the Waivers are similar to union Public Contracts.
What Can We Learn From These Default Rules and Gap-Filling Rules About the
Nature of the Corporation and the Directors’ Liabilities?
Default Rules and Gap-Fillers can signal the type of relationships to which the
rules apply. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code allows parties to design their
entire relationship for themselves, regardless of the Code’s provisions. In contrast, the
rules concerning the directors’ duty of care allow the Corporate Articles to provide the
diectors with a Waiver only within limited parameters. This difference is reflected in the
judicial Gap-Filling Rules.
When the parties depart from the Uniform Commercial Code’s provision, the
courts focus on the parties’ agreement, and use Gap-Filling Rules to which they resort in
interpreting Private Contracts. That is because the courts classify the parties’ relationship
to which the Code applies, as a contract relationship. In contrast, when corporations adopt
Waivers in the Corporate Articles, the Gap-Filling Rules that the courts apply are similar
to the rules applied to Public Contracts (legislation). These courts use these rules both to
the corporate statutes and indirectly to the Corporate Articles that were amended to
include the Waiver. The courts focus on the statutes and the limits they impose.39 In
addition, the courts examine the truth of the proxy information that the voters received
but do not limit the scope of the Waiver to that information. In this last examination, the
courts seem to determine whether the voters received truthful information. The inquiry,
however, stops at truth of information. The information that the voters received, is not
factored into the Gap-Filling rule to determine the scope of the Waivers.
The differences between Gap-Filling Rules in Private and Public Contract can tell
us about the differences between the relationships to which these rules apply, including
the identity of those who produced the text and the process by which the text was
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produced. This inquiry can thus lead to a description of the relationship among the parties
to a corporation.
PART III: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONTRACTS
What are the differences between Private and Public Contract? They are similar in
many respects, and yet, the fundamental differences between Private Contracts and
Public Contracts appear on each of these similar features. These differences also
highlight the status of corporations as Public Contracts.
The Personal Nature of Private Contracts As Compared to Public Contracts
A fundamental feature of a Private Contract is that it is a personal relationship.40
The contract involves specified, known, and identified parties. These parties need not
share the same characteristics or desires, although they share a desire to enter into the
relationship for the sake of the ultimate result that they believe benefits them. Each party
is expected to know and choose the party with whom it deals. At the foundation of the
Private Contract is an assumption that each party will not deal with other parties that it
did not choose. To be sure, there are transactions in which the parties do not know each
other, such as trading in the securities markets. However, in such cases, the parties know
the intermediary, the broker, dealer, or underwriter, who represents both parties.
A number of consequences result from this feature. The number of the parties to a
Private Contract (or their representatives) is relatively limited. The limitation may depend
on the reasonable burden that people can bear in gaining information about the other
parties or their representatives, with whom they might wish to contract. Another
consequence of the personal nature of a Private Contract is that generally, no one can join
the relationship without the consent of all the other parties. This feature of personal
choice of the other party may be blurred at the fringe of the category. For example,
historically, borrowers could choose their lenders and no lender could transfer his rights
against the borrower to another person without the borrower’s consent. That made sense
when the creditor could inflict enormous harm on the debtor who failed to pay, such as,
demanding that the debtor be imprisoned. When the rights of the creditor became less
draconian, the limits on the creditor’s right to transfer the debt owed to them were
relaxed.41
Similarly, a claim to personal services is not transferable because the personal
component of the services is very strong. Yet, on this score as well, the rules may be
more relaxed. A client of a large law firm may insist that a certain lawyer will represent
him in court. The client is not presumed to object that the brief will be prepared by
associates whom he does not know, so long as the associates act under the supervision of
the lawyer of his choice.
Directors and officers of corporations are not entirely precluded from delegating
some of their duties, but may not fully delegate all their responsibilities. In fact, the law
prohibits them from selling their office or fully delegating their functions.42 Private
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Contracts can involve institutions as parties. We buy from, and sell to, corporations. We
deposit money in banks, and appoint banks as trustees. We do not know, nor choose, the
persons with whom we deal. Yet, these relationships are limited to the institutions of
choice. They are as intensely personal or as thinly personal as they would be among
individuals. Thus, people may be less concerned whether they buy the same item from
Filene’s or Macy’s in Boston but  would not be willing to lose their power to choose a
trustee bank or even the bank as their debtor to deposit their money.
Private Contracts may involve unknown parties when the contracts entitle such
parties to inherit the Private Contract rights. But these unknown contingent parties are
fairly easily ascertainable, and become parties only upon proof of the occurrence of a
specific event. Therefore, the personal aspect of a Private Contract is not absolute but is
the starting point of any Gap-Fillers.
Public Contracts do not involve fixed specific parties that are identified in
advance. Rather, Public Contracts are open to individuals that share certain
characteristics. While in Private Contract the choice is of particular parties, in a Public
Contract the choice of membership is by the qualifications that the potential members
must have. These qualifications include, for example, residence or citizenship, or
qualification for a profession or a trade, or holding shares in a corporation, or qualifying
by age or prestige for a club membership, or a housing project. The membership could be
limited in numbers, but in publicly held corporations the number of members is limited
by the number of shares that the corporations have issued. Therefore, Public Contracts
are impersonal, even if the number of participants is small, and even if the participants
know each other.
In the case of a publicly held corporation, a shareholder who joins the group has
become a party to the Public Contract within the corporation. Entry as a party to this
contract does not depend on the choice or decision of the other parties but rather on the
terms of the entry, which are set in advance. To the extent that these terms are binding
and are not changed, a party can join whether the other parties to the Public Contract like
it or not, and whether they know who the new party is or not. It is not the consent of
others but qualifications that determine membership. Thus, the identity of the parties to a
Public Contract is not necessarily known nor fixed when the parties enter into the
relationship or later on. In this sense, a Public Contract is impersonal.
Consent v. Consensus
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Private and Public Contracts differ in the type of concurrence that binds the
parties. To be binding, Private Contract parties must consent to the terms of the contract
and to any changes in these terms.43 Consent in the Private Contract sense assumes that
the parties were free of duress, undue influence, fraud, mistake, and other circumstances
that would limit the ability of the parties to exercise their free will in binding themselves
to the terms of the contract. Therefore, a mistake, incapacity, fraud, and other limitations
on free will can excuse a party to the Private Contract from performing under the
contract.44
While Private Contract requires consent of the contracting parties, Public Contract
requires consensus. The difference is similar to the difference between signing a Private
Contract and voting in a referendum, or shareholders’ meeting or union members’ voting
on an agreement with management. If a party to a Private Contract withholds consent, the
contract cannot be concluded. In a referendum, a sufficient number of participants can
bind the rest. In addition, parties to a Private Contract can suggest any change, and gain
the others’ consent. In contrast, members to a Public Contract are more limited in their
ability to initiate changes in the terms of the contract. Their power to do so depends on
the provision which authorizes them to initiate or to demands changes.45
In most cases, the parties to a Private Contract have some contact with one other,
directly or through agents. Private Contract law entitles them to seek information from
the other parties to the relationship before the contract is executed.46 However, if a party
seeks information, the other party must disclose the truth, and a contracting party must
disclose information it knows the other party is relying on.47 If the parties relate through
intermediaries, for example, as in the case of the securities markets, the law requires the
sellers to provide the buyers with information and adopts steps to ensure that the
information is true. Thus, consent in the Private Contract sense is based on the
assumption that each party knows and understands the terms of the contract.
In contrast, not all persons who are deemed to be members of the Public Contract
express their consent to its specific terms. In this type of contract the binding consent is a
consensus. In light of the number of the parties in a Public Contract and in order to avoid
a stalemate not everyone has the right to veto the terms of the relationship to which the
majority consented. Thus, a decision by a certain percentage of members can bind all
members. In sum, in contrast to a “consent” in Private Contract, the parties to Public
Contracts express a “consensus.”
While consent is a clear expression of an agreement by specified parties to all the
terms, in the Public Contract, a consensus is less defined and specific. It denotes a
compromise.48 A consensus may exist even when the parties do not consent to all the
specific terms of the relationship but prefer to stay within the relationship rather than
leave. A consensus has more negative implications than a positive consent. It signals that
the parties have expressed no strong opposition to the terms of the Public Contract rather
than that they expressed a strong commitment to the terms. Years ago the Internet
community of “techies” adopted a motto that rejected “kings and presidents” as well as
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voting and emphasized a consensus (with respect to technical matters).49 This motto
indicates not only the open door to changes but also the open door to participants. When
the number of participants is unknown or very large, and the purpose of the group is to
expand and to change its terms of commitment, a consensus is more suitable for such
group than consent.
Knowledge of the relationship’s terms is important to render the parties obligated
under the terms of Private Contracts. In contrast, “ignorance of the law,” that is, the terms
of the Public Contract, “is no excuse” to violation of the law.50 Knowledge of the rules in
a Public Contract is not required. Even knowledge of the terms of entry into the group
may not be necessary for a person to be bound by the group’s rules. So long as the parties
entered into the group subject to the Public contract, the applicable Public contract terms
would apply to them. Most parties to the Public Ccontract are not the “founding fathers.”
They join an existing relationship whose terms are fixed and to which they may or may
not agree. Thus, to be bound by Contract requires knowledge of the contract terms and
freedom to accept an obligation. To be bound by a Public contract requires no knowledge
of the contract terms and affords little freedom to accept the obligation. A child is not
bound by a Private Contract. A baby and sometimes even an unborn child are bound by
the terms of a Public contract and benefit from its terms.
Entry and Exit
Both Private and Public Contracts are governed by entry and exit rules. To enter
the relationship, the parties depend on the explicit consent of any and all other existing
parties. Private Contract parties cannot withdraw without the consent of the other parties
to the Contract, except when the Contract specifically provides for withdrawal. Even
death does not allow the parties to terminate many types of Contracts. Unless the
Contract requires the active involvement of the party that passed away, the duties under
such Contracts pass to the estates of the deceased parties.51
Entry and exit into the Public Contract is far more flexible, depending on the
qualification of the parties and sometimes on their decision to enter or exit. Thus, in most
cases entry and exit are not dependent on the consent or permission of other existing
parties. While parties to a Private Contract cannot enter and leave at will, parties to a
Public Contract can enter and leave the relationships far more easily, depending on the
conditions attached to both entrance and exit. In most cases a shareholder is not bound to
the corporation and can sell his shares, regardless of the consent of the other
shareholders.52 A person can leave the state and generally cease to be bound by its rules.
A Public Contract, however, can impose conditions on entry and exit depending
on the consent of a select group of people. In a condominium association, for example, a
number of residents may have to agree to a new owner; in a club, entry may depend on
the recommendations of two or more members. Entry may depend on payment; exit may
depend on payment of the debts due. Generally, however, the conditions are known in
advance and are more objective, while in a Private Contract the conditions may be known
in advance but depend more on the desires of the membership. A Public Contract applies
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to a more transient population, so long as the members of the population qualify for entry
into the group.
The Impact on Third Parties
The impact of Private Contract on third parties is fairly limited. Those who did
not “sign up” are rarely bound by the Contract. The impact of the Public Contract on
third parties is far greater. Those who qualify for membership in a group may be bound
by the terms of the Public Contract, whether or not they have agreed to be subject to the
terms of the Public Contract, and even if they did not know of the existence of the Public
Contract.  Public Contracts involve communities, whose members and their families and
dependents could be bound by the terms of these Public contracts without their will or
knowledge.
Amendment of the Terms of the Relationships
The differences between the two types of relationships lead to different ways in
which the terms of the relationships are amended. Generally, Private Contract terms
change by the explicit consent of all the parties to the Contracts.53 The legitimacy of the
change is based on the parties’ consent. Generally, Public Contract terms change by the
consensus of the parties that are parties at the time of the change. That date may differ
from the original date of the Public Contract or from the date in which new members
have joined the relationship. In Public Contract, the changes of the terms are usually
effected either by the representatives of the parties, such as Congress, or by the votes of a
certain percentage of the parties, such as the shareholders, and voters in a referendum.54
A similar distinction applies to the changes pursuant to express Default Rules. If
the law offers a Default Rule for a Private Contract, all the parties to the Contract must
consent to the deviation from an existing Contract. In contrast, if the Constitution
contains a rule as a Permissive Default Rule, Congress can change the rule. If a
Permissive Default Rule allows for a referendum, then the citizens are authorized to
change the rule prospectively by another referendum. Most Permissive Default Rules in
corporate law are of the referendum kind. The representatives of the shareholders offer
the changes and the shareholders vote on the changes by a consensus.55 In some cases,
however, a certain percentage of the shareholders may initiate the vote themselves.56
Professor Lucian Bebchuk suggested a referendum on some governance rules, in light of
the changes that have occurred since the shareholders approved the rules.57 He followed
the referendum model.
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The distinctions that are described above stem rationally and naturally from the
different number of participants and the circumstances in which the relationships among
the parties arose and are going to be terminated. In fact, the distinctions must exist. These
distinctions lead to different default rules.
PART IV.  WHO CARES ABOUT THE DIFFERENT STATUS OF
CORPORATIONS?
Why Complicate Matters? Everything is Contract
Arguably, there is no need to complicate matters since everything can be
explained and treated as Contract. After all, even if an investor in a share did not
explicitly agree to the terms of the Corporate Articles, he would likely have agreed to
them, had he been asked.58 The answer is that names and differences matter a great deal.
Law is not determined solely by the speculative agreement of the parties. It is also
organized by categories, presumably – always presumably – a set of rules that the parties
would have agreed to had they been asked and had they known the circumstances of the
particular situation. Thus, law is divided into criminal law, constitutional law, tort,
Private Contract and Public Contract. To be sure, each category is based on the
assumption that if the parties had been asked they would have opted for the rules
contained in the category. Gap-Fillers of the constitution are not the same Gap Fillers for
child custody nor the same as those for Private Contract. Simplicity is desirable, but not if
it erases too many fundamental details and leads to inappropriate results.
Corporate Articles and the Waiver concern the relationship between the
shareholders and the directors. Directors hold their power and discretion in trust. The
relationship is not a Private Contract, although some of it may belong to that category.
Yet, a breach of a Private Contract does not carry with it the stigma of a breach of trust.
A beach of promise is not as pernicious as the misappropriation of what is given in
confidence. Further, the remedies for a breach of promise do not include the remedy of
accounting for ill-gotten gains but only damages (and restitution, which does not parallel
accounting for profits).59
To be sure, if courts view corporations as Private Contracts, they could achieve
the same results as if they viewed corporations as Public Contracts. The court could apply
a Gap-Filling Rule to contain a requirement that the directors (and other fiduciaries)
disgorge their profits.60 Such an approach would arguably maintain the current fiduciary
law rule. No so. The source of the rules will change. There would be no rule that requires
the directors to account for their profits. There would be a Gap-Filling interpretation of a
Private Contract that would impose this requirement. Most importantly, the basis for the
rule will change.
A crucial difference between Private and Public Contracts is in the view of the
parties’ relationship. Private Contract is based on promises, consent, and bargaining.
Public Contract is based on power and property held in trust for the benefit of others.
That is the spirit and nature of political and corporate democracy. Under the current
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category, the money and power entrusted to directors never, not even for a second,
becomes theirs. Private Contract subverts this view. If corporate relationships were
governed by Private Contract then the money would be passed to the directors, subject to
their promises to behave properly. Arguably property law could also be deemed to be a
Private Contract because most people would agree to its rules. Yet we do not put them
under the same umbrella. That is because the relationships are different.
In sum, the category of Private Contract does not fit either the reality of corporate
relationships nor the law which should be applied to people who handle other people’s
money. This is especially so with respect to rules that apply to corporate directors and
officers.
Corporations Have Evolved into Public Contracts
Daniel Boorstin describes the evolution of the groups that crossed to the
American West. At first, small groups attempted to cross on their own. They did not
survive. They were killed by wild beasts and by the Indians. For self-protection, they
formed larger groups. But members of the groups were unruly and posed dangers to each
other. To protect themselves from each other, the groups formed a government. They
chose a leader and established a “constitution,” and a jury. They purchased their food and
necessities together to gain economies of scale. The enforcement of the rules was brutal.
Serious violators were discarded and left to die. The groups were open both ways. People
could join and leave, for example, when they found land that they liked and decided to
settle.61 Upon reaching their destinations on the West Coast the groups dissolved.
Corporations of today share many of the features of the groups that crossed to the West.
While the West Coast groups shared a broad spectrum of activities and responsibilities,
both their members and today’s corporations’ shareholders  share economic and business
purposes. While members of the West Coast groups committed to behave and share in
servicing their communities, the members of today’s corporations commit their money
the corporation.
More importantly, the constitutions and rules of both groups represent Public, not
Private Contracts. Today’s shareholders vote on their Corporate Articles like the West
Coast Groups’ referendum model. In both cases the voters decide on rules that are
proposed by their boards, or leaders, or representatives. Both groups make their group
decisions by consensus rather than the consent of each member. Membership in both
groups is  subject to qualifications, but is open rather than subject to the consent of the
other members. In both groups members can leave freely, subject to rules that apply to all
members. Thus, the West Coast groups and today’s corporations are governed by Public,
and not by Private Contracts.
Public Contracts Waiving Fiduciary Duties
Those who entrust their money to fiduciaries (entrustors) have a right to rely on
the fiduciaries to act for the entrustors’ benefit.62 If the fiduciaries seek gain from their
control of the entrustors’ money or entrusted power, the fiduciaries may seek the
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entrustors’ consent, provided the fiduciaries fully inform the entrustors. This condition is
designed to change the position of the parties and alert the entrustors to the change. It
puts the fiduciaries and the entrustors in a position of parties that negotiate at arms’
length.63 In a true one-to-one relationship the information is given directly. In a Public
Contract environment, all parties must receive the information, and a consensus rather
than consent, must be reached.
Under fiduciary law, the entrustors’ permission for fiduciaries to benefit from the
fiduciary relationship is meaningful only if the entrustors have full information about the
benefits and the consequences to the entrustors. That information is usually linked to a
particular transaction. General waivers do not offer the entrustors adequate information
about the waivers’ possible consequences for them. Therefore, such waivers are not
sufficient to relieve the fiduciaries of their duties.64 If an entrustor does not know how
much he could lose from future conflicted transactions, how can he give an informed
consent? In fact, under the Uniform Trust Act the consent to conflict of interest
transactions can be recognized only after the trustee has violated the law. 65 In other cases
the required information is with respect to a specific transaction. The same requirement
of specificity applies in Public contracts that involve fiduciary relationships. For
example, the Supreme Court held that the publisher of an investment advisory newsletter
is a fiduciary of the subscribers, and must disclose to them his possible conflict of
interest.66
We noted that the courts examine the truth of the information that the
shareholders received before they voted on the Corporate Articles. The disclosure
requirement and its accuracy only partly reflect the rules of fiduciary law. That is because
the current Gap-Filling Rules relating to the Corporate Articles do not require specificity
and allow a general waiver of the directors’ duty of care, limited by the interpretation of
the Default Rule. Thus the Gap-Filling Rules are related to the text of the Default Rules
or to the truth of the disclosure, but not to the specific transactions to which the waiver
would attach. I argue that the current Gap-Filling rules have not gone far enough, and that
the limitations on Waivers should be tightened. As mentioned, Gap-Fillers are judicial
speculation on the intent of the parties. How, then should Gap-Filling rules be fashioned
in this context?
PART V: A BETTER AND MORE PRECISE GAP-FILLING RULE
If the Corporate Articles Represent a Public Contract, and if the Articles Contain
Waivers of Fiduciary Duties, How Should the Courts Interpret These Waivers?
Because the Corporate Articles are Public Contracts, they can be binding by a
consensus, provided the Articles were enacted in compliance with the required process
and did not exceed the boundaries allowed by corporate law. Judicial interpretation of the
corporate Default Rule and its limits would continue --as they do -- in interpreting other
Public Contracts. In such a case the legislative history of the corporate law and the
legislative history of the Corporate Articles should play a part.
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Yet, how should the Waiver be treated in such a case? One answer is to render the
Corporate Articles on the waiver to the situation that led to the Default Rule, that is, the
situation in Smith v. Van Gorkom. In such a case the waiver would not apply to many of
the situations that arose in the 1990s and that might persist even today. This Gap-Filling
Rule, however, would not allow the corporations and their shareholders to move from
that fixed environment at the time in which the shareholders voted on the Corporate
Articles. And yet, there is little in the legislative history of the corporate Default Rule to
suggest that the courts would be bound to such a rigid interpretation. On the other hand, it
is unclear that the legislatures intended to eliminate the fundamental principles of
fiduciary law, even though the legislatures set limitations on the scope of permissible
waivers. To allow for some flexibility for both the directors and shareholders, Gap-Filling
Rules should permit changes in the scope of the waivers, as well as provide directors with
incentives to seek the shareholders’ votes for such changes. This principle suggests an
interpretation that combines the rules of fiduciary law with the limits of the legislatures’
Default Rule.
But how can the Corporate Articles be narrowed? Should the courts look to the
environment at the time of the adoption of the Articles? Not necessarily. When the
Corporate Articles contain a Waiver, the waiver should be limited to the circumstances
that existed when the shareholders voted for the Waiver. The duty of care as stated in the
corporate statutes would continue to apply in those circumstances that are not covered by
the Corporate Articles.
Public Contracts Involving Direct Impact on the Voters
One purpose of Gap-Filling Rules is to reduce uncertainty for the parties.
Uncertainty -- at least in the case of Corporate Articles that contain the Waiver -- could
be greatly reduced if the full legislative history of the Corporate Article would be
considered and followed as a guide. This principle is especially important in the case of
the Waiver.
When Public Contracts involve a more direct impact on the voters, the Public
Contract requires a referendum. It is not surprising that in some states taxation is subject
to a referendum. It should not be surprising if Public Contracts that contain a waiver of
fiduciary duties of corporate management, should require a detailed “legislative history.”
In such cases shareholders should vote not only on principles of waiving their rights
against imprudent or careless directors but also on the specific situations in which the
directors behaved carelessly. It is only when the specific situations are outlined that the
voters would know what they are waiving.
The legislative history of Corporate Articles during the Van Gorkom era is
different from the legislative history during the Enron Era. Shareholders may be ready to
forego the directors’ carelessness in a case such as the Van Gorkom case, but not in a
case such as the Enron case. When they vote in the circumstances of Van Gorkom case,
and they had no information about a situation, such as the Enron case, they should not be
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assumed to have agreed that the Waiver they voted for would cover directors in an Enron
situation.
Therefore, the legislative history of Waivers is contained in the materials that the
voting shareholders received before they voted such as the proxy materials, which solicit
the proxies for the vote on this subject. These materials should state with an acceptable
degree of specificity the situations, which the Waiver would cover.
But might not this rule increase uncertainty? The managers might not know
before the fact where the line would be drawn between issues subject to the waiver and
those that are not. The answer is: The most specific waivers are those that are granted
after the fact. The shareholders can evaluate the directors’ actions and failures to act, and
can then approve an informed waiver. If the corporate statutes allow the corporation to
opt out of the statute and establish a stricter duty of care, the chances are that the directors
will not call upon the shareholders to take advantage of such a Default Rule to reduce the
directors’ protection from liability. But if the Corporate Articles contain Waivers, which
may not sufficiently cover situations that the directors desire to be covered, then the
directors will have great incentives to bring the issues back to the shareholders for review
and re-iteration.
Because the management will have an incentive to limit the remedies for its
breach of fiduciary duty of care, management could offer an amendment whenever the
shareholders are asked to vote for the directors or for other matters. The scope of such a
later approval will depend on the general interpretation of the statutory Default Rule as
well as on the materials that the shareholders received before they voted the previous
time, when they approved the Corporate Articles. The more often and the more specific
the shareholders’ approval of the Waiver is, the more informed the shareholders would
be, and the stronger the Waiver should hold. The process is likely to result in more
uniform judicial Gap-Filling Rules. The information that the shareholders receive before
approving the Corporate Articles containing the Waivers can guide the courts in
determining the scope of the Waivers. This development in turn could provide more
certainty and predictability for the shareholders and their directors.
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